Inside Luckin Coffee's Pre-IPO Fraud: Voucher Deals and the Stock Crash
Introduction: This article reconstructs in depth the financial fraud at Luckin Coffee before its listing, exposing the chain of operations that inflated sales by RMB 200-300 million through voucher transactions with related parties. From the $645 million raised in its IPO to a single-day stock plunge of 90%, it analyzes the regulatory investigation, management turnover and the potential risks of $140 million in unusual raw material spending, offering investors key indicators for spotting financial fraud.
Luckin Coffee's financial fraud scandal began with aggressive sales tactics before its listing. Investigations show that company employees used personal accounts to buy large quantities of vouchers, artificially creating RMB 200-300 million (about $28-42 million) in fake sales. This practice later evolved into concentrated voucher sales to a number of affiliated companies, some of whose legal representatives are relatives of founder Lu Zhengyao.
More serious violations occurred during preparations for the initial public offering (IPO). Internal documents show that more than $1.4 million in materials and service fees were paid through fictitious counterparties, with the funds ultimately flowing into corporate accounts controlled by the controlling shareholder. Such operations significantly exaggerated the revenue figures in the company's financial reports, misleading international investors, including U.S. pension funds.
The revelation set off a chain reaction: the Nasdaq exchange briefly initiated delisting proceedings, Luckin's stock plunged 90% from its peak, and after being suspended for several weeks it resumed trading at $2.11 (83% below its offering price). The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the China Securities Regulatory Commission both opened investigations, and the CEO at the time and several senior executives were forcibly removed.
The deeper impact of the fraud shows up in abnormal operating data. The latest audit report shows that the company's raw material procurement spending reached as high as $140 million in a short period—far exceeding the supply chain cost ratio of coffee brands of similar size, exposing possible secondary fictitious transactions. Industry experts note that the ingredient cost ratio at a normal freshly ground coffee shop usually stays in the 25%-35% range.

The new management team faces severe challenges. Besides cooperating with regulatory inquiries in both China and the U.S., it must rebuild consumer trust and resolve legal proceedings. Notably, the affair caused major losses for institutions worldwide that invested in Luckin stock, including several sovereign wealth funds and large asset managers.
From a professional perspective, spotting this kind of financial fraud requires close attention to indicators such as an abnormal rise in the share of related-party transactions, a mismatch between cash flow and profit growth, and a sudden change in supplier concentration. For ordinary investors, carefully reading a listed company's risk disclosure section matters more than focusing solely on the growth story.
What began as a crisis of trust in the capital markets ultimately became one of the most emblematic financial scandals in the history of Chinese companies listing in the U.S. How it unfolds will not only determine Luckin's own survival but may also affect the international financing environment for Chinese concept stocks as a whole.